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The application of the death penalty has occupied a number of
United Nations human rights treaty bodies, and in particular the Human
Rights Committee established under article 28 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ICCPR).
Article 6 of the ICCPR does not disavow capital punishment, but limits
the imposition of a capital sentence to the most serious crime. Moreover,
a capital sentence can only be pronounced upon conclusion of a trial in
which all the guarantees of due process have been scrupulously observed
under article 14 ICCPR.
The present article focuses on the approach of the Human Rights
Committee vis-A-vis the death penalty. This will be done by reference to
the Committee's periodic state reporting procedure, governed by article 40
of the ICCPR, and by reference to the Committee's jurisprudence on the
death penalty, by now well established, under the First Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR.
The Human Rights Committee is a body of eighteen independent
experts of universal composition. Of the 132 states parties to the ICCPR,
many still retain the death penalty on their books, although some are de
facto abolitionist or have not carried out executions in many years. Other
states parties, however, do resort to capital punishment. Given the
wording of article 6 of the ICCPR, the Committee cannot be openly
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abolitionist. The adoption of the Second Optional Protocol on the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in 1990, however, has given the Committee
some leverage to press states parties on the death penalty issue; many
Committee members have put probing questions on the death penalty to
State party representatives, some of which will betray their abolitionist
leanings. Thus, the tendency of the past six to eight years has been to
question states parties which do carry out executions rather critically on
their attitude towards the death penalty. This is true both for the state
reporting procedure under article 40 of the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol procedure.
I. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE PERIODIC STATE REPORTING
PROCEDURE
The Committee first addressed the issue of the death penalty in
general terms in its General Comment 6[16] on the right to life, adopted in
July 1982. In it, it suggested that while the Covenant did not prohibit the
death penalty, the article refers to abolition in terms which strongly
suggest (paragraphs 2 and 6 of the provision) that abolition is desirable. It
concluded that all measures of abolition should be considered as progress
in the enjoyment of the right to life within the meaning of article 40
ICCPR.'
This philosophy has permeated the Committee's comments on
states parties' periodic reports, in as far as the death penalty is concerned.
The following examples are illustrative:
In its Comments on the Third Periodic Report of Japan, the
Committee expressed serious concern over the number and the nature of
crimes punishable by the death penalty under the Japanese Criminal Code.
It recalled, in language that could be termed by now as standard, that the
terms of the Covenant tend toward the abolition of the death penalty and
those states which have not already abolished the death penalty are bound
to apply it only for the most serious crimes.2
Commenting on the Second Periodic Report of Cameroon, the
Committee was concerned that, in spite of a recent reduction, the number
of offenses punishable by the death penalty in the Criminal Code [was] still
excessive, in particular aggravated theft or traffic in toxic or dangerous
wastes, and at the number of death sentences handed down by the courts.3
1. General Comments under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the Covenant, 1982 Y.B. on
H.R., General Comment 6(16), Article 6, at 196-7, U.N. Sales No. E.88.XIV 6.
2. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Vol. I, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
3. Id. at 37.
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It is noteworthy that the Committee claimed the authority to
determine what, in its opinion, constitutes a most serious crime for the
purpose of article 6. By doing so, it is progressively limiting the number
of offenses for which the death penalty may legitimately be imposed.
Admittedly, the Committee's observations and concluding comments in no
way bind states parties to the Covenant, but states do pay attention to these
statements and frequently try to implement them at the domestic level.
The Committee criticizes states parties' resort to capital
punishment regardless of the legal system they adhere to. Commenting on
the second periodic report of Yemen, whose legal system is based on
Islamic law, the Committee deplored that, on the basis of the information
before it, executions of persons below the age of eighteen had taken place
and deemed this to be a clear violation of article 6, paragraph 5, of the
Covenant.4
Perhaps the Committee's most detailed criticism of the application
of the death penalty was formulated upon conclusion of the examination of
the initial report of the United States in March 1995. In its Comments, the
Committee expressed
[a] concern about the excessive number of offenses
punishable by the death penalty in a number of States, the
number of death sentences handed down by thecourts, and
the long stays on death row which, in specific instances,
may amount to a breach of article 7 of the Covenant. It
deplores the recent expansion of the death penalty under
federal law and the re-establishment of the death penalty in
certain states. It also deplores provisions in the legislation
of a number of states which allow the death penalty to be
pronounced for crimes committed by persons under 18 and
the actual instances where such sentences have been
pronounced and executed. It also regrets that, in some
cases, there appears to have been lack of protection from
the death penalty of those mentally retarded.5
In another section, the Committee criticized the United States
reservations entered in respect of articles 6, paragraph 5, prohibition of
execution of minors, and paragraph 7, exemption of the death row
phenomenon from the scope of application of the provision-the so called
Soering reservation and urged the United States Government to withdraw
4. Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Vol. 1, Annex I, at 51,
U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995).
5. Id. at 54.
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them. In this context, the Committee was undoubtedly mindful of the
objections to said reservations deposited by a number of European states
after United States ratification of the Covenant in the summer of 1992.6 It
went on to urge the Government to revise federal and state legislation with
a view to restricting the number of offenses carrying the death penalty
strictly to the most serious crimes and with a view eventually to abolishing
it. The Government was further exhorted to take steps to ensure that no
one is sentenced to death for crimes committed under the age of eighteen.
Finally, the Committee considered the determination of methods of
execution had to take into consideration the prohibition against causing
avoidable pain and urged that the Government take all necessary steps to
ensure respect of article 7 of the Covenant.7
At the same time, the case of the United States exemplifies the
limits of the Committee's capacity to influence a state's attitude vis-A-vis
the death penalty, let alone its domestic politics. While the United States
representative thanked the Committee for its carefully worded
recommendations and promised to convey them to the Clinton
Administration, he made it equally clear that the issue of withdrawal of the
U.S. reservations to articles 6 and 7 and of a possibly more restrictive
resort to capital punishment were non-negotiable politically. But even in
such a situation, the Committee's recommendations should not be
dismissed as pious or nave formulae - if they are taken up by sizable
segments of civil society and repeatedly placed before executive and
legislative bodies for consideration, the long-term effect may be far from
negligible. Finally, repeated public criticism may ultimately shame a
Government into action.
Close observers of the Committee's practice under article 40
ICCPR have charged - and not without some justification - that it has
not always been consistent in its calls for the abolition of the death penalty,
and that it may have applied a double standard with regard to abolition.
While the suggestion of abolition was put to the United States delegation,
this was not done in the cases of Yemen and Cameroon. In still other
instances, the Committee has recommended that states parties consider
ratifying the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty.'
6. Reprinted in United Nations Office of Legal Affairs C.N.377, 1993 TREATIES 21
(1994).
7. See Annual Report, supra note 4, at 56.
8. Adopted on Dec. 15, 1989, in force since July 11, 1991. Twenty-nine states were
parties to the Second Optional Protocol as of July 1996.
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The Committee has iewed with concern the movement, in some
states parties to the Covenant, towards re-introduction or extension of the
death penalty, mostly against a background of rampant violent crime or
anti-Government terrorism. Thus, the death penalty was recently re-
introduced in Chile and in El Salvador; in Guatemala, its scope was
extended. In the case of Peru, where the death penalty was re-introduced
and extended in the 1993 Constitution to a wider range of offenses than in
the 1979 Constitution, the Committee recalled its General Comment 6[16]
of July 1982 and concluded that extension of the scope of application of
the death penalty raises questions as to its compatibility with article 6 of
the Covenant.9 On another occasion, it has argued that the re-introduction
of the death penalty by a State which had previously abolished capital
punishment would raise serious issues under article 6, paragraph 6.
II. THE DEATH PENALTY UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
PROCEDURE
Since 1987, the Committee has been seized of numerous individual
complaints involving capital punishment under the Optional Protocol
procedure. Over the past decade, it has been, able to set out numerous
principles which, in their combination, limit the capacity of states parties
to carry out capital sentences. At the same time, it should be pointed out
that on no issue has the Committee been divided to such an extent as over
the death penalty, as is borne out by the ratio decidendi of, and the
numerous individual opinions appended to, many decisions addressing the
so-called death row phenomenon, as well as the views dealing with the
complex issue of extradition to face the death penalty.' 0
The Committee has consistently held that in capital cases, the
obligation of states parties to observe rigorously all the guarantees for a
fair trial set out in article 14 of the Covenant admits of no exception.
From this premise, it has developed a number of principles for the conduct
of capital cases in domestic courts, and which states parties are expected to
respect. While this article does not permit a detailed analysis of the
Committee's jurisprudence on the death penalty," the most important
statements are covered hereafter. Thus, on the issue of legal
9. Preliminary Observations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (1996).
10. Regrettably, the Summary Records of plenary debates on complaints examined under
the Optional Protocol are confidential, so that no specific examples can be given.
11. Cf. the overview of the Committee's jurisprudence in MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE (2nd ed. 1994) (discussing article 6 of the ICCPR in one of its chapters);
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 1997).
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representation of prisoners under sentence of death, the Committee has
stated that it is axiomatic that legal assistance must be made available to a
convicted prisoner under sentence of death. This, it added, applies to the
trial in the tribunal of first instance as well as to all appellate
proceedings.'"
The right of the accused to be present during his appeal has been
addressed by the Committee in several capital cases. It found violations of
article 14, paragraph 3(d), where the accused was not allowed to attend the
hearing of his appeal despite his manifest desire to do so, or where he was
represented by a lawyer whom he had not been able to instruct and who,
without consulting with his client, had abandoned one or several grounds
of appeal, thereby leaving the accused without effective representation.
13
In a recent case concerning Jamaica, the Committee held that while it had
no competence to question counsel's professional judgment that there was
no merit in the appeal, counsel should nonetheless have informed his client
of his intention not to raise any grounds of appeal, so that the latter could
have considered any other remaining options open to him. 14
In what is by now firmly established jurisprudence, the Committee
holds that violations of the fair trial provisions in article 14 ICCPR in a
capital case entail, if no further appeal against the sentence is possible, a
violation of the right to life:
[t]he imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of
a trial in which the provisions of the Covenant have not
been respected constitutes, if no further appeal against the
sentence is possible, a violation of article 6. [T]he
provision that a death sentence may be imposed only in
accordance with the law and not contrary to the provisions
of the Covenant implies that the procedural guarantees
therein prescribed must be observed, including the right to
a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption
of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defense, and
12. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 250/1987 (Reid v. Jamaica.), Views adopted
on 20 July 1990, para. 11.4.
13. See, e.g., Hum Rts. Comm., Communication No. 232/1987 (Pinto v. Trinidad), Views
adopted on 20 July 1990, para. 11.4.
14. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 353/1988 (Grant v. Jamaica), Views
adopted on 31 Mar. 1994, para. 8.6.
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the right to review of conviction and sentence by a higher
tribunal. 15
The question of what constitutes the most serious crime within the
meaning of article 6, paragraph 2, ICCPR, has been discussed in several
communications, but only one final decision is available as of the autumn
of 1996. In a recent case concerning Zambia, the complainant had been
sentenced to death for aggravated robbery involving the use of firearms.
Considering that in the circumstances of the case, no person had been
either killed or wounded, and that the domestic courts could not take these
elements into consideration when imposing the death sentence, the
Committee concluded that the mandatory imposition of the death sentence
in the circumstances was incompatible with article 6, paragraph 2. 16 While
it is obviously difficult to generalize from a single decision, one may read
between the lines that the Committee interprets the terms most serious
crime in a restrictive manner; while states may retain some margin of
discretion as to what constitutes a most serious crime, it is clear that the
list is being narrowed down progressively.
Extradition to face the death penalty is a phenomenon which has
occupied numerous judicial instances and human rights organs in recent
years. The Human Rights Committee is no exception. In three decisions
adopted in 1993 and 1994, respectively, the Committee was called upon to
determine whether the extradition by a country which has abolished the
death penalty to a country retaining capital punishment may be deemed a
violation of article 6 ICCPR. 17 In all three cases, the defendants, United
States citizens, had been either convicted of a capital offense in United
States courts or were facing capital charges in United States tribunals; they
fled to Canada, where they were apprehended, and detained pending
judicial determination of the United States' request for their extradition.
After the Supreme Court of Canada had held that they could be extradited
under the 1976 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Canada,
the complainants turned to the Human Rights Committee. While the
Committee majority held that the obligations arising under article 6,
paragraph 1, did not require Canada to refuse the applicants' extradition
without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed
and respectively carried out in the United States, an important Committee
15. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications 464 and 482/1991 (Peart v. Jamaica),
Views adopted on July 19, 1995, at 44, in U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/WP.1 (1996).
16. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 390/1990 (Lubuto v. Zambia), Views adopted
on Oct. 31, 1995.
17. This issue is dealt with in more detail in the contribution of William Schabas to the
symposium.
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minority held that by allowing the authors' extradition, Canada, a state
only retaining capital punishment for some offenses under military statutes,
was violating its obligations under article 6 by exposing individuals under
its jurisdiction to capital punishment in another state. 8
The three preceding cases have tested the Committee's consensual
decision-making procedure to its very limit. This becomes clear when one
compares the number of individual opinions appended to the decisions in
these cases, admittedly on different legal issues, to any other case
previously decided by the Committee. This author submits that the
Committee majority has been considerably more restrictive in its approach
than other national highest appellate jurisdictions recently called upon to
determine similar legal issues, e.g., the Hoge Raad of the Netherlands 19 or
the Conseil d'Etat of France. 20 In the perhaps most far-reaching judgment,
the Italian Constitutional Court recently held that an individual may not be
extradited to a state which retains the death penalty even if the receiving
states gives assurances that the death penalty, if imposed, would not be
carried out. The absolute guarantee [of the right to life] is not satisfied by
a system that allows a decision on extradition to countries with the death
penalty to be taken on a case-by-case basis, where the discretion to
evaluate the guarantees given by the requesting state lies with the
extraditing authorities.2' While this judgment may not be representative, it
is clear that the trend goes in the direction of the highest domestic
appellate instance refusing extradition to a country retaining the death
penalty if no satisfactory assurances are received from the receiving
country that the death penalty, if imposed, would not be carried out. 22
Another issue which has caused considerable discussion and
dissent within the Committee concerns the so-called death row
phenomenon, i.e. whether prolonged detention on death row can be
deemed to constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment within the
18. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications No. 469/1991 (Charles Ch. Ng. v. Canada),
Views adopted in Nov. 1993, Communication No. 470/1991 (Kindler v. Canada), Views adopted
in July 1993, Communication No. 539/1993 (Cox v. Canada), Views adopted on Oct. 31, 1994.
On the case of Joseph Kindler, see Schabas, 4 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
65-70 (1992).
19. See Jurisdiction-NATO Status of Forces Agreement-U.S. Servicemen Charged with
Criminal Offenses Overseas-European Convention on Human Rights: Short v. Kingdom of the
Netherlands, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 698 (1991).
20. Aylor v. France, Judgment of the Conseil d'Etat of Oct. 15, 1993, reported in
LIBERATION, Nov. 3, 1993.
21. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 27 June 1996, reported in BULLETIN OF
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 197-198 (Sept. 16, 1996).
22. See THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED
KINGDOM LAW 644-645 (Harris ed. 1995), for the chapter written by Markus G. Schmidt.
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meaning of article 7 ICCPR. In its first decision which addressed the
problem, the Committee did not accept the authors' argument that
detention on death row for over ten years constituted treatment contrary to
article 7:
[iun principle prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se
constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment even if
they can be a source of mental strain for the convicted
prisoners. However, the situation could be otherwise in
cases involving capital punishment and an assessment of
the circumstances of each case would be necessary.
23
The Committee's approach in Pratt and Morgan must be contrasted
with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Soering v. United Kingdom, in which the court held that the length of
detention prior to execution, the conditions of incarceration on death row,
as well as the complainant's mental state would bring the treatment on
death row within the scope of application of article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 4
In 1992, the Human Rights Committee had the opportunity to fine-
tune its jurisprudence on the death row phenomenon in the cases of Barrett
and Sutcliffe. The complainants, who had been on death row for over
thirteen years and argued that the length of their detention on death row
violated article 7. The Committee reiterated its statement from Pratt and
Morgan quoted above and added:
[i]n states whose judicial system provides for a review of
criminal convictions and sentences, an element of delay
between the lawful imposition of a sentence of death and
the exhaustion of available remedies is inherent in the
review of the sentence. Thus, even prolonged detention
under a severe custodial regime cannot generally be
considered to. constitute cruel and inhuman treatment if the
convicted person is merely availing himself of appellate
remedies.25
Significantly, one Committee member appended an individual opinion,
noting that a very long period [of detention] on death row, even if partially
23. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications Nos. 210/1986 & 225/1987 (Pratt v. Jamaica),
Views adopted on 5 Apr. 1989, para. 13.6.
24. Series A, No. 161 (1989).
25. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications Nos. 270/1988 & 271/1988 (Barrett v. Jamaica),
Views adopted on 30 Mar. 1992, para. 8.4.
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due to the failure of the condemned prisoner to exercise a remedy, cannot
exonerate the state party from its obligations under article 7.2
Although the Committee has confirmed its jurisprudence on
several occasions since 1992, the repeated changes in the formulation it
has chosen for its decisions, and a fresh look at the death row phenomenon
by the highest judicial instances of some states parties, including the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe2' and the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in London,2 8 have contributed to renewed and sometimes sharp
exchanges between Committee members on the compatibility of prolonged
detention on death row with article 7. In its latest decision, adopted in
March 1996, the Committee acknowledges that it is aware that its
jurisprudence has given rise to controversy. The detailed arguments that
follow by and large confirm the Committee's previous jurisprudence, but
at the same time some formulations in the operative part of the decision
might lock the Committee into a straightjacket, permitting it no
differentiated treatment of cases in which the length of detention exceeds
every reasonable limit.
29
The compatibility of methods of execution of a capital sentence
with international or regional human rights instruments has, to date, not
been addressed by any of the regional human rights bodies. At the
universal level, the Human Rights Committee was faced with it in 1993 in
the case of Ng v. Canada. The complainant, awaiting extradition from
Canada, argued that, if extradited to California and sentenced to death, he
would face death by gas asphyxiation in the gas chamber, which he
contended was contrary to article 7 ICCPR. The Committee began by
noting that any method of execution provided for by law must be designed
in such a way as to avoid conflict with article 7. It then noted that, by
definition, every execution of a sentence of death could be considered to
constitute cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of article 7. As
article 6, paragraph 2, permits the imposition of capital punishment for the
most serious crimes, however, the execution of the sentence must be
carried out in such a way as to cause the least possible physical mental
26. Id., as per individual opinion of Ms. Christine Chanet.
27. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General,
Supreme Court Judgment No. S.C. 73/93 (1993).
28. Pratt v. Attorney-General of Jamaica, Nov. 2, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 364.
29. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 588/1994 (Johnson v. Jamaica), Views
adopted on 22 March 1996, para. 8.2 to 8.6. Some formula, such as "Life on death row, harsh
as it may be, is preferable to death," could for example be read as ultimately legitimizing periods
of detention on death row exceeding twenty years. Two complaints currently pending under the
Optional Protocol procedure and awaiting a decision on the merits may soon require further
clarifications by the Committee.
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suffering. On the basis of the detailed information provided by the
defendant's representative, which had not been contradicted by the State
party, the Committee concluded that asphyxiation by cyanide gas would
not meet the test of least physical and mental suffering.3"
The Committee's reasoning was criticized by two Committee
members who appended their individual opinion to the views. They
rightly point out that every known method of judicial execution in use
today, including execution by lethal injection, has come under criticism for
causing prolonged pain or the necessity of having the process repeated.3'
Furthermore, if one method of execution is deemed incompatible with
article 7 ICCPR, the state party concerned may simply change the method
of execution or provide for a choice between two or several methods; this
is indeed what occurred in California, where the law now provides for a
choice between execution by lethal injection or by gas asphyxiation. 2
Finally, the Committee has not hesitated to request interim
measures of protection in many capital cases placed before it for
consideration under the Optional Protocol, The basis for requests of stays
of execution is Rule 86 of the Committee's rules of procedure, which
provides that a state party may be asked not to take measures which would
cause irreparable harm to the petitioner. Since the spring of 1987,
numerous requests for stays of execution have been addressed to states
parties in capital cases, occasionally in urgent situations in which the
execution of the petitioner was scheduled within hours. Mechanisms have
been devised by the Committee's Secretariat to process and transmit such
requests as quickly as the situation warrants. The Committee has been
careful to add that a request for interim measures does not imply, in any
way, a determination of the admissibility or the merits of the
communication. Thus, if consideration of a case is concluded with an
inadmissibility decision or a merits decision finding no violation of the
Covenant, the State party may in principle proceed with the execution.
States parties have displayed a commendably high degree of
compliance with the Committee's requests for stays of execution.
Requests under Rule 86 have been issued in approximately 150
communications involving the death penalty since 1987; in all but two
cases have stays of execution been granted by the states parties concerned.
In one instance concerning Trinidad and Tobago, the petitioner was
30. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 469/1991 (Charles Ch. Ng v.
Canada), Views adopted on 5 Nov. 1993, para. 16.2-16.4.
31. Appendix B. to Views on communication No. 469/1991, supra note 30.
32. Execution by cyanide gas asphyxiation was held to be unconstitutional in Fierro v.
Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
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executed despite a request for a stay of execution transmitted to the State
party authorities one day prior to the scheduled execution. Apprised of the
matter, the Committee plenary decided to schedule a public hearing on the
issue; 33 it expressed its indignation over the state party's failure to comply
with the request under rule 86 and adopted an unprecedented decision to
this effect, which was published in the Committee's Annual Report.34
In the second case of non-compliance during the summer of 1996,
concerning Guyana, the confidentiality of the proceedings was similarly
waived. While this procedural device obviously cannot help the victim, it
does have its use for future cases: no state party likes to see itself
criticized or placed on what amounts to a black list in public documents of
the United Nations General Assembly. On balance, the application of
rules on interim measures of protection has been efficient and prevented
many executions from being carried out. It might be added here that in
many of the capital cases from Caribbean States examined by the
Committee, to which the tenor of the judgment of November 2, 1993 of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council applies, namely that death
sentences should be commuted to life imprisonment if the appellate process
has not been completed in five years, the request for interim measures of
protection under rule 86 of the Committee's rules of procedure has the
effect of carrying the complainants beyond the five-year threshold while
their case is pending before the Committee, thus providing a ground for
commutation.35
Since 1991, the Committee has endeavored to follow up on all
those final decisions in which it found violations of the ICCPR, so as to
improve the record of states parties' compliance with its recommendations.
In numerous capital punishment cases in which the Committee concluded
that the State party had violated the complainant's right to a fair trial, it
recommended the author's release; in other cases, notably where judicial
proceedings were deemed unduly prolonged in violation of article 14,
paragraph 38, of the ICCPR, it recommended the commutation of the
death sentence. It is interesting to note that it was the death penalty cases
decided since 1989 which incited the Committee to establish what might be
termed a follow up fact-finding capacity for the Committee's Special
33. Consideration of complaints under the Optional Protocol normally takes place in closed
session, and on the basis of the parties written submissions. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 63, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
34. Id. at 70.
35. It is clear that the procedure under the Optional Protocol can be abused by
complainants simply with a view to carrying them beyond this five-year threshold-this has been
pointed out by some States parties to the Optional Protocol and was discussed in a working paper
prepared for the Committee's 57th session in July 1996 (not made public).
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Rapporteur for the follow-up on Views. This procedure is designed to
facilitate a dialogue between the Committee and state party authorities,
with a view to ultimately improving any given state party's compliance
with the Committee's recommendations.
The first such follow-up mission took place in Jamaica in June
1995. During his mission, the Special Rapporteur for the follow-up on
Views thoroughly discussed the status of implementation of Views adopted
in respect of Jamaica with highlevel government and law enforcement
officials and representatives of the judiciary. He was informed of the
constitutional and legal constraints which had made it difficult to
implement the Committee's recommendations fully.36  Nonetheless, a
number of death sentences had recently been commuted. The facilitation
of this type of follow-up dialogue is in itself a novel and welcome
development. If it further facilitates implementation of the Committee's
recommendations and results in the commutation of sentences and/or the
release of convicted prisoners, the quasi-judicial nature of the Optional
Protocol procedure will be enhanced significantly.
III. CONCLUSION
The preceding sections demonstrate that in spite of the
permissibility of the death penalty under article 6 of the Covenant, the
Human Rights Committee has used both the reporting and the Optional
Protocol procedure in an endeavor to significantly limit states parties'
resort to capital punishment. The Committee has necessarily done so in a
circumspect way - this is only natural, given that many states (and indeed
most states parties to the Covenant) retain capital punishment, and that the
trend towards abolition is slow and perhaps not even irreversible, as the
re-introduction of the death penalty by some states in recent years shows.
But the Committee has formulated such an impressive number of
procedural safeguards which must be observed before a capital sentence
can be imposed and executed that many states parties stop and pause to
reflect before imposing the ultimate punishment.
In some instances, the Committee's comments under article 40 of
the ICCPR or its recommendations in decisions adopted under the Optional
Protocol have sparked national debates on the desirability of the
maintenance or the abolition of the death penalty. If, in the process,
states' parties also realize that the imposition and execution of capital
sentences seldom fulfills the objective of deterrence, the Committee will
have -made a major contribution.
36. See Annual Report, supra note 4.
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